What are arguments good for?

Wolfgang Behrens, deputy director of the Wiesbaden State Theatre and former editor of Nachtkritik, addressed the function of arguments in theatre criticism in one of his always anecdotal but well thought-out columns ¹.

He had two references: the musicologist Carl Dahlhaus and the author Rainald Goetz. Dahlhaus insists that although arguments are psychologically secondary, i.e. they are only developed retrospectively from a preceding emotional decision, they are nevertheless primary for the validity of a judgement. ²

Behrens, however, agrees with Rainald Goetz’s view:

“The function of arguments is not … to convince others of something. In reality, arguments serve to give oneself clarity about the rationality of one’s own intuitions.” [3 Rainald Goetz, Rave. Erzählung. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2001, p. 217]

If aesthetic arguments only serve to reassure oneself of the rationality of one’s own opinion, why do we need rationality? Only for self-congratulation? As a gain in distinction, as adornment? As a selection advantage in the media public’s battle for survival? Then rationality loses its actual meaning: the harmonisation of thinking to solve common problems. The critique of rationality since Nietzsche and Foucault has always sardonically referred to the biological core of rationality. In view of the world situation, however, every ounce of rationality is valuable if we do not want to limit ourselves to the warlike self-assertion struggles of ethnic groups, empires or civilisations.

Carl Dahlhaus’ essay from 1970 refers to music and aesthetic judgements in musicology, but still provides stimulating reflections today that can be applied to theatre and its critical evaluation.

Analysis as the basis for judgement

The necessity of analysis as the basis for an aesthetic judgement arises from the absence of standards to which a judgement could be based. This has been the prerequisite for all art criticism since the end of the 18th century, when the writers of the Sturm und Drang movement turned against the poetics of rules and established the concept of genius. The standards for the judgement of a work of art are to be taken from the work of art itself ³. Therefore: no value judgement without analysing the individual work of art. And the argumentation that justifies the judgement arises from the analysis.

“The aesthetic judgement is therefore dependent on a factual judgement, which in turn includes an aesthetic decision – about the validity or lack of validity of the premises on which the analyses are based.” ⁴

(Even if it were only the “rationalisation” of a spontaneous emotional impression). This must therefore also apply to theatre criticism.

Kant and aesthetic judgement

Dahlhaus is wrong when the only thing that occurs to him about Kant’s analysis of the judgement of taste is that it should be disinterested. Contrasting the judgement of taste with the judgement of art is not Kant’s position. Kant makes a clear distinction between the judgement of the agreeable, which is purely subjective and interested in its object, and the judgement of the beautiful, which is subjective without having a practical or moral interest in its object, but contains the claim that general humanity agrees with it ⁵. Kant’s formulation is that the aesthetic judgement “appeals” for assent ⁶. And this appeal is an activity, a mental orientation towards some other person, is the reasoning that supports an aesthetic judgement.

“One solicits the approval of every other because one has a reason for doing so that is general.” ⁷

There is therefore an interest in the approval of others for an aesthetic judgement made by the art critic, hence the argument for the evaluation. A moral evaluation of works of art is of course also possible and also necessary, because the claim to validity of morality is universal.⁸ But then, according to Kant, the judgement is not a pure judgement of taste (aesthetic judgement) ⁹.  Dahlhaus himself attempts to find criteria for the inner-aesthetic judgement of works of art. And this makes his almost forgotten treatise interesting today, when the moral judgement of art threatens to overrun its aesthetic judgement.

Dahlhaus, Behrens and Goetz are right that no aesthetic judgement can be based solely on rational argumentation ¹⁰. Subjective affectation is the starting point for all aesthetic reasoning. But this argumentation “appeals” for consent and this consent is possible.

There are aesthetic arguments that can change subjective judgements. ¹¹. But what do they consist of?

Dahlhaus offers some criteria for music that can be relevant for an aesthetic judgement. In good Hegelian fashion, he finds that every criterion dissolves into its opposite if you look closely enough.

Novelty as a criterion

Novelty is a criterion that also plays a decisive role in theatre. It is divided into three areas:

1. breaking with tradition. But not every arbitrary break with the past is artistically valuable.
2. topicality. The new must in some way strike a chord with the times. Dahlhaus uses an expression of Theodor W. Adorno:  “that which is historico-philosophically of the time” (“das, was geschichtsphilosophisch an der Zeit ist”).
3. the effect of the new must potentially extend beyond the present.

If one considers the great style-defining directors of German theatre (after the great father Brecht), Sellner, Kortner, Zadek, Castorf, Schleef, then they fulfil all three aspects of novelty. However, the criterion of the future viability of the new does not justify epigonism (as could be observed with Castorf or Schleef), nor does it demand constant new breaks with tradition. A new aesthetic work of art, in the full sense of the word, enables a continuation of the aesthetic approach once gained in such a way that the criterion of topicality, the stimulation of the ever-changing nerve of the times, continues to be fulfilled. Just as in science (according to Kuhn) a new paradigm makes normal research possible, which yields further new insights. Dahlhaus’ sentence “No one is able to escape the omnipresence of the musical past.” ¹² can be turned into its opposite for the theatre: “No one can escape the omnipresence of the current zeitgeist in the theatre.”

Relational richness and intrinsic complexity

Dahlhaus calls relational richness {Beziehungsreichung} a further criterion for aesthetic judgements. This refers to the richness of internal relationships between the individual elements of a work of art. For music, these are tone sequence, rhythm, harmony, form, etc. Applied to theatre, this would be language, movement, stage design, music, costumes, props, etc.

This definition of “relational richness” is closely related to what Andreas Reckwitz calls “intrinsic complexity”. He defines complexity in a way similar to Dahlhaus:

“There is a series of elements or nodes between which relations, linkages and interactions exist. If such an interconnected context exists, we speak of complexity, the nature of which can be described as density.” ¹³

For Reckwitz, this is the criterion for a “singularity”.  His sociological analysis is that this concept of singularity, starting with art, has expanded across all products of society. Reckwitz refers to Nelson Goodman, for whom “syntactic density, semantic density, and syntactic repleteness” ¹⁴ are symptoms of the aesthetic, i.e. of art. Reckwitz extends the scope of these criteria to all singularities. For both Goodman and Reckwitz, however, these are not judgemental criteria, but merely descriptive categories. For Reckwitz, however, the status of “singularity” is the condition for “valorisation processes”, i.e. evaluative judgements in society. ¹⁵. For Goodman, works of art “are not race-horses, and picking a winner is not the primary goal.” ¹⁶ Dahlhaus, on the other hand, is engaged in such a “valorisation process” to find out what the characteristics of a good race-horse are. And so it is with theatre criticism.

Analogy and adjustment

The wealth of relationships between these different elements is aesthetically relevant, i.e. a quality criterion, if the sub-elements are also “characteristically different”. “Differentiation and integration” seems to be the postulate, differentiation in the character of individual elements and their integration into a whole. This is actually the biological concept of an organism. However, Dahlhaus also shows here that this criterion dissolves on closer analysis and proves to be historically variable. The integration of the elements can either take place as a principle of analogy (Analogieprinzip)- all dimensions of the work of art are linked in equal density – or according to the principle of adjustment or compensation {Angleichungsprinzip), if one dimension of the work of art is particularly richly linked with relationships, but others are less developed for the sake of comprehensibility. Both possibilities must be taken into account in aesthetic judgement.

To cite examples from the theatre: Jürgen Kruse’s work at Schauspielhaus Bochum was an example of the analogy principle: the greatest possible wealth of relationships between all elements of the production, the principle of overabundance to the point of incomprehensibility. Frank-Patrick Steckel’s productions, on the other hand, practised the principle of balance: the greatest possible richness of relationships on two levels, text and image, reduction on another level, movement. Johan Simons’ productions also pay homage to the principle of balance rather than the principle of analogy. Johannes Schütz’s stage sets serve as an abstract but richly evocative background for the actors. One element is reduced in its complexity (which does not diminish its significance) in order to emphasise the complexity of another level. Olaf Altmann’s stage sets for productions by Stefan Bachmann in Cologne and Basel add the function of a productive obstacle for the actors to the abstract symbolic reference to the other levels of the production.

Rank and success

Dahlhaus argues in favour of the analogy principle as a quality criterion:

“The coincidence of both richly differentiated and analogously developed moments … {is} one of the criteria from which an attempt to substantiate and justify aesthetic judgements through factual judgements can proceed.”¹⁷

For him, the analogy principle is a criterion for the artistic rank of a musical work, the adjustment principle only one for its success. He allays the lack of success of complex musical works, which can perhaps only be understood by analysing the musical text, by pointing out that

“Music, unlike linguistic formations, can be effective without being understood.” ¹⁸.

This distinction between rank and success is difficult to transfer to the theatre if it does not want to fall into esoteric isolation like New Music. Hence perhaps the primacy of the principle of adjustment in the currently successful productions. At least if a partial element of theatre is some kind of “linguistic structure”, it is true for theatre that it cannot be effective without being understood.

But theatre that is effective without being understood also exists. And its significance is increasing. This is how theatre approaches music.